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“In these past years of nation-building, we have not become less Malay, less Indian, or 
less Chinese but we have all become more Malaysian”  
(Ling Liong Sik, Malaysian Chinese Association, Secretary-General’s Report 1993:9) 
 
 
Malaysia, Truly Asia? 
Religious Pluralism in Malaysia 
 
 
 The slogan “Malaysia, Truly Asia” is commonly heard across the world as part of 
a large and expensive advertising campaign sponsored by the Malaysian government. It is 
an attempt to attract foreign visitors to this country of 22 million people which boasts of a 
highly diverse ethnic and religious composition (Embong 2001, p.59).1 51 percent of the 
population is Malay, all of whom are Muslim.2 Chinese make up 26 percent of the 
population; most of whom are Buddhists combining Taoist and Confucian practices while 
a small number identify as Christian. Indians comprise 7 percent of the population of 
whom most are Hindu with a small minority of Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. Various 
ethnic groups, such as different indigenous groups mostly situated in the Borneo region, 
and Eurasians and migrant workers, most of whom are Indonesians, make up the 
remaining 16 percent of the population (Peletz 2005, p.243). 
                                                
1 The campaign has been a tremendous success in terms of its wide coverage and response. Billboards 
promoting tourism in Malaysia can be seen in soccer stadiums in England, and on highways in Australia 
and the United Kingdom. The campaign also uses the newspaper and the television to promote tourism. 
This advertising drive prompted The Hindustan Times, one of India’s largest newspapers to write, 
“"Malaysia is all set to cash in on its multi-ethnic culture by featuring several Muslim, Hindu, Christian, 
Sikh and Buddhist houses of worship as the country's premier 'spiritual tourism' destinations” (Press Trust 
of India 2006). 
2 All ethnic Malays are Muslims. This is a unique position in comparison with other Muslim-dominated 
regions. For example, not all Arabs are Muslims. The converging of ethnicity and religion in Malaysia’s 
case can be a thorny issue as we shall see later. 
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 Despite the Muslim majority, Malaysia is not an Islamic state.3 Instead, Malaysia 
is considered to be a “Malay dominated plural society” and the freedom of practicing 
other religions is granted to everyone (Shamsul 1998, p.29). This conception of Malay 
hegemonic rule is a result of the political bargaining between the major ethnic political 
groups of Malaysia, UMNO (United Malays National Organization), MCA (Malaysian 
Chinese Association) and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) during the formation of 
post-colonial Malaysia (at that time called Malaya) in 1957. As a result of the bargaining, 
non-Malay ethnic groups such as the Chinese and Indians were granted citizenship and 
their “legitimate interests (economic rights), their rights of citizenship…and residence as 
well as their…freedom to preserve, practice and propagate their religion, culture and 
language” were recognized (Ibrahim, p.128).   
In return, Malays “retained their major symbols of their nation, that is, their 
sultans, their special position, their language (as the official language), and their religion 
(Islam as their religion)” (Ibrahim, p.128). In addition, special rights were granted to 
protect the Malays. This is enshrined in the controversial and often quoted Article 153 in 
the constitution of Malaysia. According to this article, those who “profess the religion of 
Islam, habitually speak the Malay language, and conform to Malay customs” are entitled 
for special reservation of quotas in three specific areas: public services, education, and 
business licenses, without harming the rights of other ethnic groups. Thus it is important 
to emphasize that Malaysia is founded “not on individual rights but on what political 
                                                
3 The question of whether Malaysia is an Islamic state remains highly contentious and ambiguous. The 
former prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad stated explicitly that Malaysia is an Islamic state 
on September 29, 2001. This was seen as a political move to detract supporters from the rising Islamic 
resurgence in Malaysia. Mahathir’s statement provoked an outrage from the Chinese and Indian 
communities who claimed that Malaysia is not an Islamic state under the Federal Constitution.  
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theorists have come to refer to as ‘ethnically differentiated citizenship’” (Hefner 2001, 
p.29).4  
 The state of religious pluralism in Malaysia firmly hinges upon understanding the 
importance of Article 153. According to Zawawi Ibrahim, the article “remains as the 
most important legal charter and document, which spell[s] out the essential guidelines for 
the nation-state to manage its ethnicity and national identity, and could only be amended 
via constitutional amendments, which have to be passed by the Parliament” (Ibrahim, 
p.128). The Article was conceived as part of an “ethnic bargain” that was achieved 
through the spirit of mutual tolerance and respect. It is also an attempt to protect the 
unique ethnic and racial diversity of Malaysia from being destroyed by violence that is so 
often seen in other countries with different ethnic groups.5 The mutual tolerance and 
respect among different ethnic groups exemplified in the creation of Article 153 is firmly 
rooted within the pluralistic history of Malaysia. A deeper understanding of Malaysia’s 
pre and post-colonial history is necessary to understand the state of religious and racial 
pluralism in Malaysia. 
 
Pre-colonial Pluralism and Colonial Pluralism in Malaysia 
 The land of Malaysia has been the center of trade and commerce since the tenth 
century AD when ancient Malay kingdoms were discovered in the northern peninsular 
region of Malaysia. Most of these kingdoms were under Buddhist or Hindu influence. 
                                                
4 Although Malaysia was founded on a basis of “differentiated citizenship” for its different ethnic groups, it 
is important to highlight the fact that this move may have triggered Malaysia’s economic growth and 
helped to avoid the forms of racial violence that have plagued countries such as Indonesia which is built on 
an equal form of citizenship (Hefner 2001, 28). 
5 The term ‘ethnic’ (bangsa) and ‘racial’ (kaum) is used interchangeably in this paper due to Malaysia’s 
multicultural circumstances. Malays (or any other ethnic groups) can therefore be considered as either an 
ethnic group or racial group.    
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During that time, the region was highly coveted due to its geographical position situated 
in between the Chinese and Indian civilizations.  
  Islam was believed to have arrived in Malaysia around the 14th century through 
Arab traders from the Middle-East. However, it was not until the establishment of the 
Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th century that Islam became the dominant religion in the 
Southeast Asian region. During this era, Malacca became the main trading port of Asia 
where European merchants wanted to obtain the valuable commodity of spices that were 
readily available in Asia but not in Europe. On the other hand, Asian traders came to seek 
foreign goods in return for theirs. The strategic position of Malacca, sheltered by the 
adjacent Sumatran land, provided protection from the harsh monsoon winds for the 
traveling merchants. These traders would spend months in Malacca waiting for the wind 
directions to change in order to have the right conditions to sail home. Malacca quickly 
became one of the busiest cosmopolitan cities in Asia resulting in it being dubbed “the 
Venice of the East.”  
The first ruler of Malacca, Parameswara, converted to Islam after his marriage to 
the princess Malik Ul Salih of Pasai.6 It was during this period that Islam spread to all the 
territories of the sultanate including the majority of modern day Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sumatra in Indonesia and northern Thailand. During this period, laypeople and traders 
alike embraced Islam because of the advantages which came with identifying oneself 
with the ruler’s religion. Despite being the predominant religion in the kingdom of 
Malacca, Islam was not imposed upon its people and foreign traders, allowing people 
                                                
6 It was believed that Parameswara was a descendant of Alexander the Great. Parameswara was previously 
a Hindu and after his conversion to Islam, he assumed the name of Sultan Megat Iskandar Shah.  
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with different religions to co-exist together. This was one of the first recorded instances 
of ethnic and religious pluralism in Malaysia.  
Foreigners easily integrated themselves into the local Malay culture. Many 
foreign traders such as the Europeans and the Chinese familiarized themselves with the 
Malay customs and learned to speak the Malay language. Cross-cultural marriages 
between traders and the people of Malacca were common during this period. The 
marriage of the sixth ruler of Malacca, Sultan Mansur Syah, to a Chinese princess, Hang 
Li Po, further encouraged cross-cultural marriages.7 The legacy of these marriages can be 
seen today in the Peranakan culture where they are a group of ethnic Chinese who 
practice a syncretic blend of Malay and Chinese culture by speaking the Malay language 
while maintaining the Buddhist tradition.  
  The establishment of the Sultanate of Malacca and the earlier Malay kingdoms 
highlights a form of cultural pluralism that already existed not just in pre-colonial 
Malaysia but also around Southeast Asia due to the remarkable growth of its coastal ports. 
This form of pluralism engendered a mindset of respect and tolerance amongst the locals 
and the traders. The Malaysia historian Wang Gungwu explains, “…the tradition of 
coastal pluralism evolved in island Southeast Asia, including the various states that 
became Malaysia, from earliest times…The port towns were conspicuous examples of 
cultural pluralism in the traditional milieu and were open to new and alien influences” 
(Ibrahim, p.117). He also added that this form of cultural pluralism became “an integral 
part of a local reality” (Ibrahim, p.117). This “local reality” would prepare the locals for 
the impending reign of colonial pluralism.  
                                                
7 Hang Li Po’s conversion to Islam was one of the many conversions which took place during that time.  
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The rule of the Sultanate of Malacca would last for a century until it was 
conquered by the Portuguese in 1511. The fall of Malacca at the hands of the Portuguese 
represents the beginning of foreign colonization of Malaysia. Malacca prospered for 
another century until the invasion of Malacca by the Dutch. This was followed by the 
intervention of the British during the late eighteenth century which subsequently led to 
the colonization of Malacca and ultimately the whole of peninsular and Borneo Malaysia. 
This period of colonization lasted for almost two centuries until independence was 
granted to Malaysia in 1957.8  
The coming of the British transformed the history of Malaysia forever. It has been 
argued that British colonial rule altered the shape of ethnic and religious pluralism in 
Malaysia. The Malaysian social anthropologist, Zawawi Ibrahim, contends that “it was 
the subsequent elaborations by colonialism upon this “initial pluralism” [pre-colonial 
pluralism] which gave rise to the ethnicism and competing ethnicities currently inherited 
by the modern Malaysian nation-state” (Ibrahim, p.116). Ibrahim’s assertion is accurate if 
one were to look at the colonialists’ policies during their rule in Malaysia. The British 
had the acumen to symbolically acknowledge the sultans’ sovereignty over each state, 
whose rule encompassed matters relating to the Malay tradition such as the customs 
(adat), the language (bahasa), and Islam. The sultans were also provided with 
“bureaucratic and legal machinery to implement their directives in a more systematic and 
invasive manner than ever before in Malay history” (Hefner 2001, p.16). In spite of these 
moves, the colonialists were primarily responsible for the running of the colonized Malay 
states because “it [the British move of giving symbolic powers to the Sultan] divorced the 
                                                
8 Due to the focus of this paper, this work will not explain the historical issue of how British came to 
colonize Malaysia but instead, it will focus on what the British did during colonization which affected the 
state of religious pluralism in Malaysia.  
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traditional ruling class from the economic affairs of the modern colonial system by 
dismantling their ‘feudal’ rights of surplus appropriation over the subject class” (Ibrahim, 
p.120).9  
The British imported many Chinese and Indian workers into Malaysia to fulfill 
the labor shortage. Early nineteenth century Malaysia represented a period when it was 
covered with “vast forest expanses and [a] relatively small Malay population who were 
mostly situated in the peninsula’s few fertile rice growing regions” (Hefner 2001, p.18). 
Most of the population was concentrated in the Straits Settlements comprised of Penang, 
Malacca, and Singapore which were busy cosmopolitan cities. Though short in labor to 
uncover the vast riches of Malaysia’s natural resources through mining and plantations, 
the British were unwilling to teach these skills to the Malays because “the political costs 
of such a strategy would have been high” (Hefner 2001, p.18). The teaching of these 
skills would mean that the Malays would learn to master the trade and might revolt 
against their colonial masters. In order to prevent this from happening, the British 
imported a large amount of skilled Chinese and Indians into Malaysia which inevitably 
heralded the coming of “colonial pluralism.” 
During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Malaysia became 
the largest tin producer in the world and the Chinese people were needed to share their 
expertise in this field. The British invited the Indians because of the need for labor in the 
plantation sector, especially in the rubber industry which was a boon for the British.10 
                                                
9 This is unlike what happened to the monarchy in Indonesia. The Dutch removed the power from the 
monarchy and this caused the loss of their sovereignty. This is a crucial difference between Malaysia and 
Indonesia because the removal of power from the Indonesian monarchy symbolized the loss of the 
monarch’s control over Islam.  
10 The Indians who migrated to Malaysia were primarily South Indians from the surrounding regions of 
Madras (now called Chennai). They were encouraged to migrate by the British rulers in India.  
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The coming of the Chinese and Indian ethnic groups inevitably altered the ethno-
pluralistic setting of Malaysia. Due to the influx, the Chinese outnumbered the Malays in 
peninsular Malaysia by the early 1920s.11 A decade later, the Chinese population in the 
four federated states (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) that were subject to 
the direct rule of the British comprised 64 percent of the population. In other states that 
were not under direct British rule, the Chinese comprised only 27 percent (Hefner 2001, 
p.18). This imbalance of the ethnic composition presented an obvious problem to the 
socio-economic stability of the country which was further compounded by the ‘divide 
and rule’ policy of the British. Under colonialism, different ethnic groups were not 
allowed to intermingle with each other, instead they existed mainly within their own 
ethnic spheres. The Malays were primarily in the rural areas doing agricultural work 
while most of the educated Malays were hired as government servants. Chinese people 
dominated the trade industry while Indians remained in the plantation sector.  
This period of colonialism in Malaysia fits the mold of J. S. Furnivall’s theory of 
pluralism. Furnivall was largely responsible for coining and introducing the term 
“pluralism” to the European world. He derived his theory from his experience of colonial 
economies in Burma and Indonesia. Hefner summarizes Furnivall’s definition of 
pluralism:  
According to Furnivall, “a plural society is a society that comprises ‘two or more 
elements of social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political 
unit.’ As with Chinese, Indians, and Malays in British Malaya, this combination of 
geographical propinquity and social segregation, Furnivall argued, is accompanied by a 
caste-like division of labor, in which ethnoreligious groups play different economic roles.  
                                                
11 This large migration of Chinese into the country represented the second wave of migration since the time 
of the Sultanate of Malacca. Most of them were Han Chinese, an ethnic term which originated from the 
Han Dynasty, 206 BC-AD 221 (Heng 1998, 52).  
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This social segregation in turn gives rise to what Furnivall regarded as these societies’ 
most unsettling political trait: their lack of a common social will” (Hefner 2001, p.4).12 
 
The policy of ‘divide and rule’ certainly worked for the colonialists in terms of gaining 
capital. However, in the process, they created a society that was only symbolically plural. 
During this period of “colonial pluralism,” the lack of interaction between these different 
ethnic groups resulted in each ethnic group’s lack of knowledge of each other. The lack 
of interaction also caused each ethnic group to identify itself more with its motherland 
rather than Malaysia.  
 This policy of “divide and rule” further destabilized the ethnic stability of the 
country because ethnic groups like the Chinese were perceived as being wealthier than 
others. Due to the widespread business influence of the Chinese which ranged from the 
production of tin and rubber to the transportation sector, the Chinese community was 
seen as monopolizing the economy and as a result, the migrant community especially the 
Chinese was perceived as a threat to the Malays. Hefner explains, “Inasmuch as Chinese 
and Indians figured in this formulation (of ethnic pluralism), they did so largely 
negatively –as foreigners who threatened to marginalize Malays in their homeland” 
(Hefner 2001, p.24). This misperception against the Chinese community built a silent 
wall of tension between the different ethnic groups of Malaysia. Unbeknownst to the 
Malays and Indians, most of the riches were in the hands of the British.13 The fact was 
that a “large majority of Chinese were lowly-paid wage-earners employed in tin mines, 
                                                
12 Furnivall believes that plural societies are inherently flawed because they are “unable to cope with the 
problem of piecing their societal puzzle into a unified whole” (Siddique 2000, p.167). These flaws are due 
to two reasons. Firstly, Furnivall argues that the people in these societies are using their creative energies to 
maintain boundaries rather than eradicating them. Secondly, the people’s preoccupation with the plural 
economy serves as a distraction for interaction with other communities.  
13 Regarding the financial control of the British, Heng writes, “As late as 1970, 13 years after independence, 
British capital still dominated the Malaysian economy: foreign (mainly British) ownership of corporate 
equity in Peninsular Malaysia was 63.3 percent, the non-Malay (mainly Chinese) was 32.3 percent, and the 
Malay share was 2.4 percent (Heng. 1998, p.55).  
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rubber plantations and unskilled urban sector jobs. A minority were self-employed small 
proprietors and ever fewer were affluent capitalists” (Heng 1998, p.54).  
 The “divide and rule” policy also meant that religion was not a contentious issue 
between different ethnic groups. The lack of interaction between these groups meant that 
they could practice their religion freely without fearing any reprisal from other groups. 
There was also a distinct separation between religion and the British-governed state 
during this period of colonial pluralism. As the symbolic rulers of the Malay states and 
the protectors of the Islamic faith, the sultans played their role to ensure that the Malay 
culture and their religion of Islam were not denigrated in the midst of this influx of other 
religions. However, no socio-economic protective measures were introduced to help the 
Malays to compete with the thriving Chinese-dominated merchant community who had 
already established a network of capital and credit through their connections with 
different Chinese associations and chambers of commerce which were already 
established as early as 1906 (Heng 1998, p.55).14  
  The colonialists’ policy of indifference towards the socio-economic development 
of these ethnic groups, especially with the Malays, highlighted their role in creating a 
society that not only “lacked a common social will” but more seriously, one that was 
separated into different economic positions based upon ethno-religious background. 
Ibrahim argues, “…colonialism condemned the Malay peasantry, who were the majority 
of the Malay masses, to a marginal position of economic and educational backwardness-a 
situation, which for a long time contributed to the “ethnicization” of the poverty question 
                                                
14 These associations and chambers of commerce were mostly clan-based or had religious connections.  
These clans originated from different Chinese ethnic groups who spoke different dialects such as Mandarin, 
Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese. Most of these associations were linked to various Buddhist temples 
creating a vast network of Chinese community.  
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and the discourse in post-colonial Malaysia” (Ibrahim, p.121). In spite of this, the 
colonialists must not be blamed entirely for this “ethnicization” of the economy. The 
Malay rulers must also take a share of the blame for not being able to protect the 
economic rights of the Malay people. These socio-economic failures of both the 
colonialists and the Malay rulers would pose a serious problem to Malaysia when it was 
granted independence from the British in 1957. 
 
Pluralism after Malaysia’s Independence 
 Malaysia was granted independence during the de-colonization period in the 
middle of the twentieth century. Colonial countries in Asia such as India and Indonesia 
gained independence from their colonial masters and Malaysia’s turn was to follow when 
the British could no longer sustain their colonizing position after the Second World War.  
 After nearly two centuries of colonial rule, Malaysia finally became a sovereign 
nation state. The first general election in the country in 1955 was won by the Alliance 
(Parti Perikatan) that was led by Malaysia’s Father of Independence, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman.15 The Alliance consisted of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 
the main political party of the Malays, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the 
party for the Chinese and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which represented the 
Indian community. One of the major controversial issues in this young nation state was 
the question of citizenship among different ethnic groups. While the Malays were 
acknowledged as the rightful owners of the land along with the indigenous people, the 
                                                
15 The Alliance is the predecessor to Barisan Nasional or National Front which is the current ruling 
coalition group in Malaysia. 
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rights to citizenship of the Chinese and Indians were questioned.16 When the British tried 
to establish the Malayan Union in 1949 which gave equal citizenship to all Malaysians 
regardless of their ethnicity, the proposal triggered widespread protests from the Malays. 
The sultans were united in their protest and refused to co-operate in this effort. Due to the 
fierce protests, the plan had to be abandoned by the British. This example highlights the 
sensitivity of the issue of non-Malay citizenship for Malays. 
  A concession was finally achieved between UMNO, MCA and MIC regarding 
the issue of citizenship and special rights for Malays. As explained in the introduction to 
this paper, this concession was enshrined in the Malaysian constitution under Article 153 
which entitles citizenship to non-Malays and in return, grants Malays special rights in the 
field of education, in public services and in commerce. Non-Malay communities obtained 
Malaysian citizenship but it was not an equal citizenship. In Robert Hefner’s words, this 
form of citizenship was a “differentiated citizenship” (Hefner 2001, p.29).  
 This concession must be analyzed carefully due to the sensitivity of the issue. 
UMNO were unwilling to grant equal citizenship to the non-Malay communities because 
they feared that the Chinese and Indians might overtake them socio-economically and 
inevitably result in the loss of their own sovereign rights. However, UMNO, which held 
the majority of the Malay votes, needed the support from the Chinese and Indians to 
appear as a politically united front in order to rule the country. Additionally, UMNO 
needed the economic support and knowledge from the wealthy Chinese community in the 
early years of the new nation to help the rural Malays to break the barriers of poverty. On 
the other hand, the Chinese and Indian communities had no choice but to concede to the 
                                                
16 The Malays and the indigenous people of Malaysia are called “bumiputera” or translated literally as the 
“princes of the soil” or “sons of the soil”.  
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request of the Malays in terms of the “differentiated citizenship” because it was 
politically impossible for the Malay rulers to grant equal citizenship to them after the 
strong reaction against the idea of a Malayan Union.  
 The independence of Malaysia did not improve the economic situation of the poor. 
According to Ibrahim, “The average income of the bottom 10 percent of all households 
decreased by 31 percent, from $49 to $33 per month, between 1957-1970…income 
equality worsened for the total population as well as within each community, with the 
Malays taking the lead” (Ibrahim, p.130). This highlighted the problem of massive 
economic inequality between the rich and the poor during the early years of the nation. 
Ethnicity played a vital role in this inequality; while a significant part of the Chinese and 
British communities continued to prosper, Malays and Indians remained entrenched in 
their poverty. Unemployment rates were also high in the cities and this primarily affected 
the Chinese and the growing number of Malay migrants. The failure of the ruling party to 
create a viable Malay capitalist class was perceived as the source of unemployment 
amongst the growing numbers of Malay in the cities (Ibrahim, p.131).  
 The economic inequality triggered the eruption of the worst ethnic violence ever 
seen in the country on May 13, 1969. What started out as a victory celebration in Kuala 
Lumpur for the Chinese opposition party, DAP (Democratic Action Party) who won a 
significant number of seats during the general election of that year, ended up provoking 
the Malay community in the city. This resulted in counter demonstrations which 
ultimately resulted in several days of ethnic riots between the Malays and the Chinese. It 
was estimated that about 6,000 residents of Kuala Lumpur, most of them Chinese, lost 
their homes and property. 178 people, mostly Chinese, were killed during the riots. Non-
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governmental sources challenged the accuracy of these figures and claimed that the death 
tolls were higher (Heng 1998, p.65). This event highlighted the crisis which plagued the 
young nation-state as she struggled to discover her identity and seek the “common social 
will” in the midst of the multi-cultural setting of Malaysia.17 
 The May 13 riots changed the socio-economic setting of Malaysia and Malaysians 
altogether. The new Malay-dominated rightist government, under the helm of Tun Abdul 
Razak, introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), an affirmative action based policy as 
a measure to eradicate poverty amongst the Malays.18 Michael Peletz, an anthropologist 
who is an expert in Southeast Asian issues contends that the NEP was a measure to 
“restructure society by undermining the material and symbolic connections between 
ethnic categories on the one hand and economic standing and function on the other” 
(Peletz 2005, p.245).19 This policy of restructuring the society involved ethnic and racial 
politics where special allocations were granted to Malays. Peletz explains:  
By pursuing policies to help the predominantly rural and agricultural Malays “catch up” 
economically with Chinese and Indians, the government has placed tremendous emphasis 
on “race” (on being a Malay and a non-Malay) as a criterion in allocating government 
                                                
17 The May 13 riots still remain a taboo in Malaysia. Discussions about the riots are avoided because of its 
highly controversial nature. A recent controversy erupted over a university textbook for a class on Ethnic 
Relations which blamed the racial riots solely on DAP. This book was highly controversial because of the 
way the incident was interpreted and led to the immediate withdrawal of the textbook by Prime Minister 
Badawi. In withdrawing the book, he said, “This book must be seen as an important book because it is a 
reference for our students, and we need to take into account matters that are sensitive to all the races…I feel 
that while historical facts should not be changed, we must bear in mind that our interpretation of history is 
also important, that we should not raise matters that can create unhealthy situations” (The Star, July 20, 
2006).  
18 Malaysia’s Father of Independence, Tunku Abdul Rahman lost his political power as a result of the May 
13 incident. This represented the political shift to a more virulent form of racial politics under Tun Abdul 
Razak. 
19 It is important to emphasize that despite NEP’s strong bias toward the Malays, it also aimed to improve 
the conditions of non-Malays as well. Heng explains, “Through the NEP the nation was committed to  an 
ambitious 20-year policy of not only reducing the level of (Malay) poverty, but more significantly, to 
increasing the Malay share of the national wealth while integrating the Malays into the urban economic 
sector. The success of the policy was to be measured chiefly in terms of numerical targets set for Malay and 
non-Malay ownership of corporate equity: between 1970 and 1990, the Malay share was to increase from 
2.4 percent to 30 percent., the non-Malay (mainly Chinese) share from 32.3 percent to 40 percent, and the 
foreign share to drop from 63.3 percent to 30 percent” (Heng 1998, p.67).   
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loans and subsidies and other scarce resources (university scholarships, contractors’ 
licenses, start-up funds for businesses, etc.). These policies have heightened the 
awareness of distinctions between Malays and non-Malays and made them all the more 
politically and economically salient (Peletz 2005, p.245).  
 
This restructuring of the socio-economic fabric of Malaysia through affirmative action 
became an attempt to incorporate Malays into the Malaysian economy and to produce 
more middle-class Malays. This policy initially drew outrage from the Chinese 
community but they were forced to silently acquiesce to the demands of NEP due to their 
lack of political power. As a result, Chinese businessmen learned to adapt to the policy 
by working with the Malays to produce a successful and healthy working relationship. 
This relationship has been nicknamed as “Ali-Baba partnerships” and has served both 
ethnic groups well. For the Malays, they can learn to master the tools of the trade from 
Chinese businessmen while Chinese businessmen can take advantage of this partnership 
to further their businesses. 
 The NEP was successful in producing a new generation of middle-class Malays 
while eradicating poverty at the same time. The level of education among the Malays also 
improved tremendously. It was reported that between the early 1970s and 1993, middle-
class Malays burgeoned from 18 percent to 28 percent of the population. Additionally, 
the Malay agricultural population decreased significantly from 65.2 percent to 33.5 
percent (Hefner 2001, p.30).  Despite the apparent success of the NEP, many Malays 
remained unhappy about this policy because of the widely held perception that the policy 
helped only some Malays and not all, resulting in the creation of two distinct classes of 
Malays; those who have benefited from the NEP and those who have not. Thus, some 
Malays became rich and affluent while the rest of them remained entrenched in their 
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poverty. The dissatisfaction with the NEP also originated from the widespread corruption 
and cronyism that was taking place during the implementation of this policy.   
 Many scholars have argued quite rightly that the Malays’ discontent towards the 
NEP fueled the Islamic resurgence movement in Malaysia during the 1970s. This 
resurgence is a continuation of the early Islamic revivalism in Malaysia which occurred 
during the 1920s and 1930s as a tool to promote Islamic nationalism and reform. It is no 
accident that this resurgence coincided with the Islamic revivalist movements in countries 
like Indonesia, Egypt, Libya and Pakistan. One of the groups which spearheaded this 
resurgence was ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Islamic Youth 
Movement) led by the young Anwar Ibrahim who would later become Malaysia’s 
Finance Minister and Deputy Minister and who was acrimoniously sacked and jailed for 
six years following his spectacular fall-out with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Another group which yielded immense 
influence was (PAS) Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party), an Islamic 
political party that fought for the establishment of Malaysia as an Islamic state. 
 Scholars have viewed the Islamic resurgence movement or the dakwah movement 
in Malaysia as “a powerful vehicle for the articulation of moral opposition to government 
development policies, traditional as well as emergent class structures, other ethnic groups, 
or some combination of these or related phenomena” (Peletz 2005, p.246). This 
movement seeks to “revitalize or reactualize (local) Islam and the (local) Muslim 
community by encouraging stronger commitment to the teachings of the Qur’an and the 
hadith, in order to effect a more Islamic way of life (din)” (Peletz 2005, p.246). Apart 
from being perceived as a movement caused by the Malays’ disenchantment with the 
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NEP, the resurgence was also a resistance against the capitalistic path of Malaysia that 
mimicked the West. Hence, this movement grew as a call to the Malaysian government 
and the growing Muslim middle class to return to the Islamic path. 
 This Islamic resurgence exacerbated the growing hostility between Malays and 
non-Malays ever since the implementation of the NEP. Non-Malays felt that not only was 
their socio-economic position under threat but their right to practice their religion was 
challenged as well. Robert Hefner explains: 
…the Islamic resurgence and state set-asides have fortified the Malay versus non-Malay 
divide. The fact that a major stream in the Islamic resurgence has been colored by ethnic 
chauvinism has “inhibited interethnic and inter religious relations and widened social 
distance between communities (Hefner 2001, p.51). 
 
The increasing distance and tension between different ethnic communities plagued the 
pluralistic setting of Malaysia during the 1970s and 1980s. This tension highlights the 
continuous problem of multi-cultural Malaysia to adopt a “common social will” that is 
vital to the harmonious growth of a nation. 
   Under the new Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, elected in 1981, the 
government took measures to control the Islamic resurgence. One of the measures was 
using the government to espouse its own Islamicization programs to counter the 
resurgence.  These programs championed the notion of moderate Islam in light of the 
multi-cultural setting of Malaysia.  Additionally, the government also institutionalized 
Islam by “establishing an Islam[ic] banking system, streamlining the administration of 
Islam, and setting up the Islamic International University” (Embong 2001, p.64). 
Politically, parties such as ABIM were co-opted into UMNO resulting in the loss of a 
powerful ally to PAS. All these efforts, compounded with the stunning economic 
development of Malaysia under Mahathir during the late 20th century resulted in the slow 
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but steady establishment of “a common social will” for Malaysians of all races and 
religions.  
 
The State of Religious Pluralism in Malaysia Today 
 The astounding economic development of Malaysia during the late 20th century 
and early 21st century under Mahathir has propelled Malaysia to become one of the 
richest Southeast Asian countries. The Asian economic crisis in 1997 dealt a crippling 
blow to the economy and consequently to the people’s well-being. However, what was 
remarkable during this crisis was the absence of ethnic violence that was experienced in 
neighboring Indonesia. This highlights the remarkable growth of the Malaysian society in 
terms of their understanding of and respect for each other’s ethnic and religious 
background.   
 While this growth can be attributed primarily to the economic success of the 
country, other notable factors must be taken into account to explain the molding of 
Malaysia into a cohesive and pluralistic society. The establishment of a strong middle-
class, not just among Malays but also among non-Malays has created an educated and 
sophisticated society who can relate to and communicate with those who are not from 
their ethnic groups. New housing developments in cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, 
Georgetown and Johor Bharu have integrated neighborhoods that are no longer confined 
to specific ethnic groups. This has enabled the creation of a new generation of 
Malaysians who experience multi-culturalism on a daily basis. Education policies that 
were reformed after the May 13 riots created a more literate society because schools were 
no longer a privilege for the rich but a social necessity. As a result, students from all 
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ethnic backgrounds were given the chance to intermingle with each other. The opening of 
the doors of Chinese and Indian schools allowed non-Chinese and non-Indian parents to 
send their children to these schools to learn an extra language or to take advantage of 
better educational opportunities offered in these schools. These factors have led to the 
creation of a new Malaysian society that is developing a “common social will” despite its 
ethnic barriers.  
 The retirement of Mahathir in 2003 after ruling the country for 22 years signified 
the end of an important era of Malaysian politics. The torch was passed to Abdullah 
Badawi who was Mahathir’s chosen successor. Mahathir’s retirement came during a time 
when the multi-religious setting of Malaysia was under threat from the growing global 
Islamic fundamentalist movement. The events of September 11, 2001 were significant 
because Malaysia was indirectly linked to fundamentalist movements like Al-Qaeda.  
There were reports claiming that Malaysia became a “staging area” or “launching 
pad” where Al-Qaeda members met to plan their next attack (Peletz 2005, p.241). These 
reports were backed by evidence to support their claims. In November 2000, Yazid 
Sufaat was photographed hosting Nawak Alhazmi, Khalid al-Midhar and Zacarias 
Mousasaoui in his condominium in Malaysia. All three of them were directly connected 
to the September 11 events (Peletz 2005, p.241). The Southeast Asian based Islamic 
terrorist group, Jemaayah Islamiyah (JI) that was directly responsible for the three 
massive bombings in Indonesia: Bali in 2002, the Marriott Hotel Bombing in 2003 and 
the 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing, included Malaysians who were directly involved 
with the group’s activities. Azahari Husein, a doctorate holder from the University of 
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Reading in England was “the Demolition Man” while Nordin Mohamad Top was the 
bomb maker of the group.  
As a result of this rise in Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia, Badawi has 
introduced Islamization programs to counter the resurgence not just in Malaysia but also 
in other Islamic countries. One of his most remarkable moves is the introduction of the 
concept of Islam Hadhari (Civilised Islam) which is a ten-point set of canonical 
principles that calls for both physical and spiritual development by emphasizing 
economic, social and political progress. The ten points are, 
1. Faith and piety in Allah 
2. A just and trustworthy government 
3. A free and independent people 
4. Mastery of knowledge 
5. Balanced and comprehensive development 
6. A good quality of life 
7. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women 
8. Cultural and moral integrity 
9. Protection of the environment 
10. Strong defenses 
 
Badawi explains that “Islam Hadhari is not a new religion or a new religious order but 
merely re-emphasises the centrality of Islam in the daily lives of its believers” (The Star, 
July 25, 2006). He asserts that Islam Hadhari “can help bring Muslims into the modern 
world and integrate them in the modern economy.” The term ‘integrate’ is important 
because Islam Hadhari wants the Islamic world to integrate and not assimilate into the 
modern economy. This careful integration into the global economy allows for the 
retaining of their cultural identity. Additionally, the concept also “promotes tolerance and 
understanding, moderation and peace, certainly enlightenment” (Badawi 2005). More 
importantly, Badawi believes that Islam Hadhari can help in preventing the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism.  
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Badawi has implemented these reforms in Malaysia with impressive results. The 
economy is currently recovering consistently from the Asian economic crisis and 
corruption is at an all-time low.20 The International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) 
is fast becoming one of the major Islamic institutions in the world that is comparable with 
the esteemed Al-Azhar University of Egypt and attracts many students from Islamic 
countries. IIUM offers programs not only in Islamic studies but in science as well ranging 
from engineering to medicine.  
The strong undercurrent of Islamization programs such as Islam Hadhari in 
Malaysia has created a subtle tension between Malays and non-Malays. Non-Malay 
communities are fearful that these programs might impinge on their own rights. Badawi 
has been quick to assuage the situation by claiming that Islam Hadhari is a concept that is 
only meant for Muslims and will not directly impinge on the non-Malays’ right to 
practice their own religion.21 This underlines the thin line that is constantly negotiated by 
Badawi and his government in light of the drive to promote themselves as a moderate 
Islamic government without forsaking the religious rights of other ethnic groups.  
Despite proclaiming themselves as a moderate Islamic government, several 
religious controversies have challenged this notion. The issue of Malaysians’ freedom of 
                                                
20 In a speech given at the Developing Eight (D8) summit which was attended by the Iranian President, 
Mahmoud Ahmaddinejad, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Turkish president, 
Reccep Tayyip Erdogan and others on May 13th 2006 in Bali, he said that “fighting corruption was one of 
the most fundamental issues pertaining to good governance…Corruption must be eradicated in the 
management of our respective economies as it only benefits a few at the expense of many. Corruption 
disrupts the entire governmental process, undermines morality and erodes ethical behavior.” In this fight 
against corruption, Badawi also promoted Islam Hadhari “as a comprehensive approach for the 
development of mankind, society and country, based on the perspective of Islamic teachings and Islamic 
civilization” (Parkaran 2006).  
21 Interestingly, Badawi explains that the principle of Islam Hadhari extends to non-Muslims as well. He 
asserts, “As an approach to religion, we feel everyone should be comfortable with Islam Hadhari because it 
embodies principles which are universally familiar and accepted…Islam Hadhari is a progressive approach 
for all Malaysians whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims” (The Star, 2006). This highlights the 
ambiguous tone of Badawi’s Islam Hadhari when it comes to other non-Islamic religions.  
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religion is questioned, especially when it comes to Islam.22 The controversial case of the 
late M. Moorthy tested the waters of religious tolerance in Malaysia. Moorthy, originally 
a Hindu, was alleged to have converted to Islam by the syariah court before his untimely 
death.23 Hence, he was buried in the traditional Islamic way. However, his wife, M. 
Kaliammal claimed that she had evidence proving that Moorthy was a Hindu before his 
death and sought to take the case to the Malaysian court system to have him buried 
according to traditional Hindu rites. Unfortunately, her case was rejected as it was 
deemed as not being under the powers of the civil court but the syariah court of 
Malaysia.24 Kaliammal has launched another appeal and her case is awaiting hearing in 
September 2006. 
The current controversy surrounding the case of Lina Joy provides another 
example concerning the freedom of religion of an individual. Joy (her real name was 
Azlina Jalani) was once a Muslim but converted to Christianity. She wanted to drop 
Islam from her identification card as her religion but was not permitted to do so by the 
National Registry Department (NRD). Joy brought her case to the court of appeals and 
like Moorthy’s case, the civil court dismissed her case based on the same argument that 
this matter was under the auspices of the syariah court. This controversy underlines the 
issue of one’s religious freedom in Malaysia, especially when it comes to Malays. 
Adherents from other faiths can convert to other religions but not Muslims who can be 
deemed apostates and punished under the syariah court. 
                                                
22 Article 11 in the Federal Constitution proclaims the freedom of religion to all Malaysians regardless of 
their ethnicity.  
23 Moorthy was one of the members of the first Malaysian team who successfully scaled Mount Everest in 
1997. 
24 The Malaysian civil court does not have the power to nullify any decisions made by the Syariah Court 
(Ng 2006). The Malaysian judicial system is comprised of two different kinds of law: the civil law and 
syariah law. All Malaysians are bound by civil law, while practicing Muslims are bound by both civil and 
syariah law.  
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Apart from questions concerning an individual’s freedom of religion in Malaysia, 
there is also a growing concern among Muslims, especially among clerics, that the 
increased pluralistic setting of Malaysia can erode Muslims’ faith.  During the recent 
2006 Ulama Convention in the Perak state, the mufti from Perak, Harussani Zakaria 
warned against pluralism and liberalism in his keynote speech. He said, “If left 
unchecked, liberalism and pluralism will be difficult to control.” He added that “Muslims, 
whether policymakers or ordinary people, should know that liberalism and pluralism 
were alien to the fundamentals of Islam” and warned against “the threats to Islam posed 
by these elements” (Mustafa 2006). As a result of this stance against pluralism and 
liberalism, activities which encourage multi-cultural unity were seen as a threat to Islam 
because they might erode Muslims’ faith. Events such as “shared celebrations” (kongsi 
raya) which stands for open houses organized by the government to celebrate different 
ethnic groups’ celebrations (such as Chinese New Year, Eid al-Adha and Deepavali) 
which fall around the same time were discouraged by the clerics. The clerics’ statements 
were unpopular with the government and also with the people who strongly objected to 
the clerics’ anti-pluralist stance. This incident reflected the underlying tension between 
the government and the Islamic religious leaders where one tries to be more moderate 
while the other is becoming more conservative in light of Malaysia’s current economic 
growth in the era of globalization.   
The question of religious pluralism was recently challenged during the planned 
demolition of unregistered Hindu temples in Kuala Lumpur, in order to make space for 
development. Local state councils who were responsible for these projects claim that 
these temples (most were built before Malaysia’s independence in 1957) are illegal 
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because they are not registered. Additionally, most of these temples also reside on 
government land.  These demolitions came with alleged police brutality against 
protesting Indians. Inevitably these actions infuriated not only Malaysian Indians, but 
also Indians around the world. Most Indians blamed the actions on the government’s lack 
of intervention and insensitivity to the temple demolition exercise. One Malaysian 
opposition source noted, “The government is breaking down [Hindu] temples because 
they can afford to do it to the Indians…we have never heard of a mosque being broken 
down for development" (Bukhari 2006). Charles Santiago, head of the local organization, 
Monitoring Sustainability of Globalization, commented that the “breaking of Indians 
temples is dehumanizing to the Indian community” and added that "this could unleash a 
violent resistance that will have serious consequences” (Bukhari 2006). Both the 
government’s and the local councils’ insensitivity to this issue might prove to be the 
trigger to an already tense situation in Malaysia. The notion of respect for other religions 
is negated in the face of impending development but at what cost for the country and its 
inter-ethnic relations?25 
The state of religious pluralism in Malaysia is one that is intrinsically connected 
to the question of ethnicity. The question of respect for each other’s religion subsequently 
engenders a respect for one’s ethnicity as well. Additionally, socio-economic and socio-
political factors also play a crucial role in creating a harmonious and peaceful multi-
cultural Malaysia. These are all factors which constantly need to be monitored in order to 
ensure that the rights of all Malaysians are secured. In order for this to happen, there need 
to be influential intellectuals and organizations which play the key role of addressing 
                                                
25 The Asia Times (July 11, 2006) reports that the controversy around this issue has led to all demolition 
activities to be delayed until further notice from the state councils but reports have noted that the 
demolitions are still rife especially in the state of Selangor. 
 25 
these issues concerning religious pluralism. This is important because these individuals 
and organizations seek to inform and educate the public about the necessity of 
maintaining respect for each other’s religions, thus avoiding any eruption of ethnic 
violence that has been experienced in Malaysia’s history. 
 
Influential Malaysians and Malaysian organizations working on the Question of 
Religious Pluralism 
 
Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi 
 As the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Badawi has been credited for his uprightness 
in his leadership and his style of governance. Badawi was born into a highly influential 
religious and political family. He later obtained his degree in Islamic Studies from the 
University of Malaya in 1964. One of Badawi’s most important contributions to the issue 
of religious pluralism in Malaysia is his notion of Islam Hadhari that was explained 
earlier in the paper. This notion addressed the ways where both Islam and development 
can work together to advance the Muslim community not just in Malaysia but also 
globally. Additionally, Islam Hadhari also encourages respect for other religions. The 
stunning electoral victory in 2004 was proof of Malaysians’ approval of his campaign to 
moderate Islam and to eradicate corruption.  
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Chandra Muzaffar and JUST 
Trained as a political scientist, Muzaffar is one of the leading intellectual voices 
of Malaysia. He was the first director of University of Malaya’s Center for Civilizational 
Dialogue in March 1997. However, later he was removed from his post for his 
oppositional role during the Anwar political crisis in late 1997. Muzaffar is currently the 
president of JUST: International Movement for a JUST World which seeks to raise global 
awareness concerning issues of injustice and globalization. JUST is now an established 
international non-profit network whose advisory board boasts of intellectuals such as 
Noam Chomsky and Richard Falk. Muzaffar is a known critic of Israel’s policy in the 
Middle-East and also the United States’ foreign policy and more importantly, he is a 
critic of the Malaysian government. He is well-known for his stance on ethnic and 
religious equality in Malaysia.  
Though a Muslim himself, Muzaffar constantly fights for the rights of non-
Malays. As such, he is directly opposed to the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. He says, 
“Islamic resurgents…are completely trapped in an exclusive concept of Islam dominated 
by laws and rituals and symbols.” He adds, “…this negative attitude of various Muslim 
groups exposes the real nature of their political struggle. It is just another way of 
preserving Malayism” (Riddell 2001, p.256). Recently, in the controversy surrounding 
the National Ulama Convention’s attack on religious pluralism, he wrote a response 
article titled What Pluralism Means to Islam in Malaysia’s widely read newspaper The 
Star. In the article he referred to various instances in Islamic history where Islam 
embraced pluralism. He contends that the anti-pluralism stance is one that is “narrow and 
exclusivist” especially in a country like Malaysia. In his conclusion, he writes,  
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There is no doubt at all that many Malaysian Muslims under the tutelage of the ulama 
subscribe to such interpretations of the religion. It is reflected in their blind adherence to 
certain aspects of the Fiqh (jurisprudential) tradition which have been discarded in other 
parts of the Muslim world.   
If a narrow interpretation of text and tradition in order to bolster an exclusive notion of 
religious identity has tremendous pull among Malaysian Muslims, it is partly because of 
the country’s delicate ethnic balance which reinforces the siege mentality on all sides 
(Muzaffar 2006). 
The role of Chandra Muzaffar is best summarized by Peter Riddell where he writes, 
“Chandra has served for several decades as a type of public conscience, holding the 
leading actors on the Malaysian political and religious stage to account (Riddell 2001, 
p.258). 
Zainah Anwar and Sisters in Islam 
Zainah Anwar is the founder of Malaysia’s well-established Sisters in Islam who 
plays the important role of “pushing the boundaries of women’s rights within Islam and 
within the framework of a country that is fast modernizing and relatively democratic” 
(Anwar 2001, p.227). Despite the modernization that has taken place in Malaysia, women 
are still trapped in the lower echelons of the patriarchal structure of Malaysian society. 
As a result of this, Sisters in Islam was created to address issues regarding the rights of 
Muslim women in Malaysia. Anwar has fought against the Islamic resurgence in 
Malaysia by advocating a closer reading of the Qur’anic text. In her reading with other 
members of Sisters in Islam, she discovers that the Qur’an advocates for the rights of 
women, but it is the male interpreters of the text who have taken away their rights. She 
writes: 
Our reading opened a world of Islam that we could recognize, a world for women that 
was filled with love and mercy and with equality and justice. We need not look any 
farther to validate our struggle. Women’s rights were rooted in our tradition, in our faith. 
We were more convinced than ever that it is not Islam that oppresses women, but 
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interpretations of the Qur’an influenced by the cultural practices and values of a 
patriarchal society (Anwar 2001, p.228). 
As a result of their reading of the Qur’an, Anwar, through Sisters in Islam has demanded 
for the recognition of women’s rights in Malaysia. They have campaigned intensely 
against the practice of polygamy in Malaysian Muslim households because many who 
practice it do not strictly adhere to the Qur’anic laws on polygamy. Anwar’s courageous 
efforts have been recognized by the government when she was appointed to become a 
member of Malaysia’s Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) in 1999. 
Patricia Martinez 
 Patricia Martinez was the first non-Muslim Malaysian to hold a doctorate in the 
field of Islamic Studies in Malaysia. Additionally, she also holds postgraduate degrees in 
the Comparative Study of Religion, Christian Theology and Women’s Studies. Currently 
she is an associate professor at the University of Malaya’s Asia-Europe Institute (AEI) 
and she is also a senior research fellow for Religion and Culture and is currently the Head 
of the Inter-cultural Research hub at AEI. 
 Martinez has been frequently invited to foreign universities to lecture on the topic 
of Islam in Southeast Asia. She also plays the important role of monitoring the 
government’s actions in dealing with its multi-cultural identity. She is a frequent critic of 
the government’s inability or refusal to allow people to talk about matters pertaining to 
their religion. She explains, “The [government and media] should create a sense that 
people should talk about their differences… Instead, there's been a sheer infantilizing of 
all of us to the point that we're unable to articulate ourselves on an issue that has become 
central to defining ourselves as Malaysians” (Gatsiounis 2005). However she refuses to 
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solely blame the government but instead put some of the blame on the people as well. 
According to her, “We self-sensor ourselves more than government sensors us. There's a 
reluctance [among Malaysians] to be offensive” (Gatsounis 2005).  She emphasizes an 
important point here about the self-censoring nature of Malaysians. This tendency is 
derived from Malaysians’ unwillingness to instigate ethnic tensions, a fear which can be 
detrimental to the growth of the country.26  While this highlights the tolerant and 
respectful nature of Malaysians, their inability or unwillingness to talk to others about 
their religion remains a handicap to the overall religious maturity of the country.   
Anwar Ibrahim 
 Anwar Ibrahim is most well known for his spectacular political fall-out with the 
then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
This fall-out resulted in his six-year imprisonment for the alleged trumped-up charges of 
sodomy and corruption. During his early days, he was a charismatic leader of ABIM, 
(Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) and was known for his anti-government stance 
until he was co-opted into UMNO and subsequently the ruling government itself. Today, 
he is a distinguished visiting professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign 
Service.  
Anwar is a fervent advocate for political reforms such as the weeding out of 
corruption not just in Malaysia but in other Islamic countries. He sees these reforms as a 
way to eradicate terrorism. Anwar is a strong supporter of the multi-cultural nature of 
Malaysia. In an interview he comments, “I agree that there is a role for religion in society, 
                                                
26 Malaysians are discouraged from talking about inflammatory issues such as ethnicity and religion. 
Anyone caught inciting others on these issues can be punished under the controversial Internal Security Act 
(ISA) where people can be held in detention without any evidence of their wrongdoing.  
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and people should be given the choice of observing their own religious practices. The 
environment can be created to encourage tolerance on the issues of faith, spirituality and 
moral values, and I don't see this to be in juxtaposition or in contradiction of our views on 
governance, democracy and freedom” (Anwar 2006). Anwar is also concerned about 
Malaysians’ inability to mature themselves culturally. He says: 
Malaysia has rich a heritage of being a multiracial, pluralistic society, and, at the same 
time, it has been relatively tolerant, although there have been instances in the past of 
racial riots, etc. We have demonstrated sustained economic growth for decades. 
Compared to most Muslim countries, Malaysia is a success story. My concern is that we 
are not moving forward; we are not maturing as a culture. We are not prepared to shift 
both the political philosophy and the economic policy. For example, look at freedom in 
the media; we are about the lowest in the world. Look at corruption; it is not being 
addressed. And corruption can be endemic and cancerous (Anwar 2006). 
 
While the question of corruption is slowly being addressed by Prime Minister Badawi, 
the Malaysian media and Malaysians still have a long way to go before fully learning 
about how to exercise their rights to freedom of expression. The Malaysian government 
restricts this right to freedom of expression because questions of religion and ethnicity 
are extremely sensitive and might result in serious repercussions such as ethnic tensions 
if these matters are not discussed in a mature and respectful manner.  
 
Malaysian Interfaith Network (MIN) 
 The Malaysian Interfaith Network (MIN) was founded on February 15, 2003 
through the efforts of Anwar Fazal who gathered together organizations from all religious 
faiths to form this organization. There are about 30 participating organizations ranging 
from the Malaysian Consultative Council on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and 
Sikhism (MCCBCHS), Sisters in Islam, the Council of Churches of Malaysia and many 
others. MIN was founded with the aim of promoting religious dialogue among faith 
organizations in Malaysia as well as trying to foster understanding on common issues of 
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concern amongst its participants. In spite of their efforts, MIN has kept a low-profile and 
has not been active in promoting inter-religious dialogue.  
 
Conclusion: The Malaysian Dilemma   
 The 21st century represents a period of great uncertainty about Malaysia’s state of 
religious pluralism. It is a serious question which affects all Malaysians because the 
outcome of this uncertainty will determine Malaysia’s socio-economic position globally. 
While Malaysians have learned to live with people from other ethnic backgrounds, they 
are now confronted with a problem which arises as a result of this achievement. The 
uncertainty lies in the question of how can Malaysians live with each other’s religion in 
an age where all forms of religious fundamentalism are manifesting themselves globally.  
  The multi-religious setting of Malaysia is challenged by notions of religious 
relativism. How does one acknowledge the truths of his or her own religion without 
belittling or diminishing the truth(s) in other religions? This is a question that Malaysians 
have to deal with in their daily setting. Some have practiced a form of respect that is 
mixed with tolerance for other believers while most have remained silent and ignorant (if 
not indifferent) to this issue. The adage “ignorance is bliss” can be aptly used to describe 
the Malaysian society. Malaysians, in their educational and social upbringing are taught 
that religious discussions should not be held in public but instead should be kept in the 
private realm. This is advocated with the intention of being sensitive to people from other 
ethnic backgrounds. While the intention is good, the outcome is otherwise because it 
cultivates a paradox within many Malaysians; they remain a sophisticated society in 
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terms of their material growth but are constrained when it comes to the understanding of 
their multi-religiosity and multi-ethnicity.27 
 The paradoxical nature of Malaysians is also aided by Malaysia’s economic boom 
in the last two decades that was interrupted by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Due to 
effective governmental measures, Malaysia has almost certainly recovered from the crisis. 
As mentioned earlier, the Malaysians’ ability to steer away from the ethnic violence seen 
in Indonesia is an indication of Malaysia’s maturity as a country which espouses respect 
and tolerance for other ethnic groups. Inadvertently, the economic growth has created a 
Malaysian society that prefers to remain silent on matters pertaining to religion in order 
to avoid disrupting the continuous growth of the country.28 
 The government’s role in promoting silence rather than discussion when it comes 
to the understanding of multi-religious of Malaysia does not help to improve the situation. 
Any religious issue deemed sensitive is often dealt with silence rather than with 
discussion. The media is discouraged from reporting on matters related to religion. 
Movies which touch on religion issues such as Mel Gibson’s The Passion are banned due 
                                                
27 While it has been mentioned earlier that the improved education system allowed students to become 
more literate and aware of their multi-religiosity, it must be emphasized that the improved education 
system has created a policy of silence when it comes to more controversial issues such as ethnicity and 
religion. In the Malaysian education system where students are allowed to intermingle freely, students are 
discouraged from talking about religion. There are no religious classes except for Malays who are required 
to attend a class on Islam. Non-Malays are required to attend a class titled “Moral Ethics.”  
28 This attitude of indifference is succinctly summed up by Mark Heim, a Christian theologian who visited 
Kuala Lumpur in 2004, “The positive outlook [of Malaysians on religious and ethnic harmony] appears to 
be rooted in two factors. The first is a lively lack of complacency. Malaysians look around and know that 
the peace they enjoy is fragile. At independence in 1957, many predicted racial or religious civil war for the 
country, and a communist insurgency was put down only after a major struggle. The second factor is the 
Malaysian economic miracle. As one of the Asian "tigers" alongside Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Taiwan, Malaysia has seen development lift all ethnic boats. And everyone understands that ethnic 
conflict could reverse that reality, driving off the foreign investment, tourism and multinational 
corporations that have been carefully courted” (Heim 2004). 
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to its religious content.29 Furthermore books pertaining to the sensitive issues of religion 
were also banned by the civil court from being distributed in Malaysia. Recently, the 
International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) reported that Malaysia has banned 
eighteen books on religion and Islam, including Karen Armstrong’s The Battle for God: 
Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (2001) and John Esposito’s What 
Everyone Needs to Know About Islam (2002). These books were banned under the 
Printing Presses and Publishing Act of 1984 which forbids the distribution of materials 
which can disrupt the country’s peace. According to Sisters of Islam, the government has 
banned a total of 45 books. The organization comments:  
We are particularly concerned over the increasing number of books on Islam and religion 
that are being banned…the space for discourse is narrowing and Malaysian readers are 
being deprived of ideas and debates by renowned scholars and writers, published by 
reputable institutions such as the Oxford University Press (IFEX 2006). 
 
The banning of these books and movies certainly does not help to promote discussions 
about religion in Malaysia. Without the proper understanding of the religion of their 
neighbors, it is difficult, if not impossible for Malaysians to truly learn to live with their 
neighbors and be pluralistic. Consequently, without knowing how to live with their 
neighbors, Malaysians simply cannot begin to have a “common social will” that is so 
vital to the harmonious growth of the country. 
 The government’s role in silencing inter-faith discussions is best exemplified by 
Badawi’s recent banning of inter-faith forums on Article 11 in the Malaysian constitution 
which touches upon an individual’s religious freedom in Malaysia. According to Badawi, 
these forums must be stopped because “they are deemed to cause tension in our multi-
religious society” (Habib and Shari, 2006). He also said that “If the discussions are not 
                                                
29 In an interesting twist, Christian churches were allowed to screen The Passion and only churchgoers 
were allowed to watch this movie.  
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kept in check or contained, they are bound to raise tension in our multi-religious society. 
Religious issues are even more sensitive than ethnic issues” (Habib and Shari, 2006).30 
This summarizes the Malaysian dilemma of today; how can Malaysians learn to co-exist 
peacefully without even learning who their neighbors are ethnically and religiously?  
  The question of religious pluralism is one which confronts all Malaysians and it 
necessitates a solution. While the solution is not easy and needs to endure different social 
experimentations, many different groups and individuals have sensed the urgency to 
create a viable solution to this issue. The need to create a Malaysian nation that is truly 
Asian, one which truly respects religious diversity, is more important than ever in this era 
of global terrorism because of Malaysia’s potential to become a shining example of an 
effective moderate Islamic majority country. In his visit to Malaysia to attend the World 
Council of Churches meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the Christian theologian Mark Heim 
wrote of Malaysia’s potential to become a role model to other Islamic countries: 
Malaysia is a country rich in such juxtapositions [combining development with old 
Islamic traditions], sometimes jarring to sensibilities formed in other cultures. The 
juxtapositions suggest that historical processes rarely repeat themselves identically and 
that our familiar constellations of ideas and movements are not fixed. They are subject to 
reformulation. What is under way in Malaysia is one possible future for Islam. And with 
that Islamic future Christianity may, God willing, have a fruitful and a peaceful 
appointment (Heim, 2004).  
 
While Malaysia aspires to become a role model to other countries, the solution to the 
Malaysian dilemma must first be confronted and solved. Thus, the first step to creating a 
                                                
30 In February 2005, the Bar Council of Malaysia organized a forum consisting of different religious 
organizations to discuss about the creation of an Interfaith Commission (IFC) to promote a better 
understanding of the different religions in Malaysia. However, Islamic organizations refused to join 
because they feared that the commission might “weaken Islam”. Subsequently, the government stopped the 
forum because it was deemed unnecessary while at the same time paradoxically voicing the need for inter-
faith dialogue (US Department of State, 2005).  The Malaysian government’s encouragement of inter-faith 
dialogue can be observed in the World Council of Churches’ (WCC) meeting in Malaysia in 2004. It was 
the first time that the WCC held a meeting in a Muslim majority state. It can be argued that the Malaysian 
government can allow inter-faith dialogue to take place as long as it does not impinge on religious 
discussions which concerning Malaysians. 
 35 
solution is to know the “Other” and this can only mean that all Malaysians must engage 
themselves in discussions concerning ethnic and religious pluralism for it is only then 
that Malaysia can be on the verge of becoming truly Asia, not just symbolically, but in 
practice as well.  
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